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This paper analyzes the factors that explain supply and demand of local public transportation. 
Together with variables related to economics and mobility, we consider variables reflecting 
institutional characteristics and geographical patterns. Being a political capital increases supply and 
demand of local public transportation, inequality is associated with higher supply, and contracting out 
reduces supply. Furthermore, our regional analysis allows us capturing the effect of geographical 
characteristics and different traditions of government intervention. In all, we provide first evidence on 
the role played by institutional and regional characteristics useful to achieve a better understanding of 
local public transportation supply and demand. 
Keywords 





Mobility is becoming increasingly essential in large cities as a consequence of its impact on social, 
economic and geographic development. In fact, transportation potentially affects the nature of the 
urban area itself (Small, 1997), and for this reason the literature on the relationship between travel 
behavior and urban form has grown at a fast pace during recent decades (Rodríguez, Targa and Aytur, 
2006).
1  
Indeed, citizens in developed economies understand mobility as a right, especially in large cities 
where congestion and pollution make private transportation more inconvenient and expensive. In such 
urban environments, transport effectiveness and efficiency not only affect local and regional 
productivity rates, they also have an impact on citizens’ quality of life. 
The aim of this paper is to identify those factors explaining local public transportation of large 
European cities from both the supply and demand sides. In this effort, we characterize aggregate 
supply and demand equations, which are separately (OLS) and jointly estimated (SUR), and we test 
the impact of well-known determinants by the transportation literature, as well as new explanatory 
variables that suggest interesting relationships between urban transport development, institutions and 
regional heterogeneity within Europe. 
The contributions of the present paper are twofold. The first one relies on the fact that, to our 
knowledge, this is the first study attempting to explain urban transportation – both supply and demand 
- by using an international sample of large cities.
2 Taking into account supply and demand together, 
and enjoying a world-wide database of large cities, produces results of interest to both scholars and 
policy makers. The second contribution is the analysis of institutional and geographical factors as 
determinants of transport supply and demand, which have also been largely neglected by previous 
transportation and geographic literature, and which might play an important role on local public 
transportation determination. Therefore, this paper tries to further connect institutional and geographic 
fields to transportation at a local level. 
As expected, our results confirm that socioeconomic variables and factors related to the generalized 
cost of transportation play the most important role on local public transportation. However, we also 
find interesting significant and insignificant relationships between Supply/Demand and institutional 
variables such as being a political capital, having an elected or appointed mayor, the choice between in 
house and contracting out production to private firms, among others. Also, we show the existence of 
regional heterogeneity behind the design of urban public transportation supply that seems to have a 
significant explanatory power. Some of these results highlight the lower use of public transport in 
southern countries and the relatively higher provision of public transport in eastern cities as heritage of 
their communist past. 
The rest of the study is organized as follows. The next section is a brief review of the related 
literature on urban public transportation. Section 3 describes the empirical strategy pursued to 
determine transport supply and demand equations. Here we offer detailed information on the data and 
variables used, and the methodology applied. The fourth section presents the main results, and the last 
                                                      
∗  We are thankful for financial support from the Spanish Commission of Science and Technology (SEJ2006-04985). We 
have benefited from comments by Xavier Fageda and Anne Yvrande-Billon. 
1  Some relevant works are Sasaki (1990), Banister (1995), Banister, Watson and Wood (1997), Giuliano and Narayan 
(2003). 
2  Gordon and Willson (1984) also used an international data set (data for 1978) of metropolitan cities but they only focused 
on light rail transport and estimated a semilog model of its demand (ridership per Km of lane) with only four exogenous 
variables. Moreover, they did not carry any analysis on supply determinants. Daniel Albalate and Germà Bel 
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section (Section 5) concludes with some final remarks on our findings and its main contribution to the 
literature. 
2. Related literature 
The literature on public transport demand and supply enjoys a long tradition in the field of transport 
economics. Nonetheless, given the local dimension of the service, most studies have considered only 
single metropolitan areas, regions or countries for their analysis. As a consequence, few studies use 
international samples, and within this group, most studies are constructed as meta-analyses derived 
from different national or local studies. 
Price and time elasticities, modal choice and externalities internalization have been the leading 
topics in the recent literature on urban public transport demand. The work by Dargay and Hanly 
(2002) uses data on English counties to estimate a dynamic relationship between per capita bus 
patronage and bus fares. Their work distinguishes between the short and long-term impact of fare 
changes on bus patronage--as do most studies on this issue--and provides an indication of the time 
required for the total response to occur.  
Matas (2004) also estimates an aggregate demand function for bus and underground trips in the 
metropolitan area of Madrid, Spain in order to obtain the demand elasticities of the main attributes of 
public transport services. The study’s second objective is to evaluate the impact on revenue of the 
introduction of the travel card scheme by estimating a matrix of own and cross-price elasticities for 
different ticket types. For the same metropolitan area we have the recent study by García-Ferrer et al. 
(2006), which studies the incidence of alternative types of public transport modes.  
Hensher (1998) also distinguishes between fare classes across train and bus modes of public 
transportation and the car for commuting travel in the Sydney, Australia metropolitan area, while 
Marchese (2006) uses her theoretical model to show that integrated tariffs can be used to extract the 
consumer's surplus if there are a lot of connections supplied. 
The meta-analyses by Nijkamp and Pepping (1998), Kremers et al. (2002) and by Holmgren (2007) 
review the wide variation in demand elasticities found in the literature. The first focuses on price 
elasticity, while the latter also considers other elements. In fact, it sheds light on the importance of 
including car ownership, own price, income and some measures of service in demand models. 
Moreover, it supports the position that explanatory variables should be in per capita terms if 
population is not included in the model. 
Close to these studies but more focused on the determinants of demand of public transport, we find 
Paulley et al. (2006), which concentrates on the influence of fares in the UK, though it also studies the 
roles played by quality of service, income and car ownership. Related to this last element, Bresson et 
al. (2004) present a panel data analysis for French urban areas, finding a clear downward trend in 
public transport patronage that is mainly due to increasing car ownership. In addition, the use of public 
transport appears to be quite sensitive to the volume supplied and its price, which makes the financial 
equilibrium of this industry problematic.  
Regarding mode choice we can mention the recent study by Sungyop and Ulfarsson (2008), which 
analyzes transportation mode choice for short home-based trips using a survey from a part of 
Washington State, or the paper by Asensio (2002), which reveals elasticities for commuters using 
different modes in Barcelona, Spain. 
Finally, a large group of recent theoretical and empirical studies have worked on pricing schemes 
to internalize the external costs of transport by linking subsidies, price of public transport and road 
charges. De Borger et al. (1996) develop a simple theoretical model that determines optimal prices for 
private and public urban transport services, taking into account all relevant private and external costs. What shapes local public transportation in Europe? 
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Similar works with relevant extensions can be found in De Borger, Kerstens and Costa (2002), 
Pedersen (2003), Small (2004), and Parry and Small (2007), among others.  
On the supply side we find that technical efficiency and determinants of production cost structure 
have been the main foci of study. Less common are works on the determinants of transport supply 
systems. To this extent, Brueckner and Selod (2006) recently advanced the construction of a political 
economy model where public transport system (supply) is endogenously determined. Nonetheless, no 
empirical strategy is used to test their hypothesis. De Borger and Wouters (1998) also simulate a 
model on supply decisions based on the influence of prices and traffic flows in Belgium, but further 
research on these determinants is needed. Others like Fernández, Cea and de Grange (2005) and 
Fernández, de Cea and Malbran (2008) have also recently made efforts to link demand responsiveness 
to supply design.  
On the other hand, we find many relevant works on cost structure and technical efficiency. The 
work of Farsi, Fetz and Filippini (2007), analyzes the cost structure of the Swiss urban public transport 
sector in order to assess scale and scope economies. The significant economies of scope estimated 
favor integrated multi-mode operations as opposed to unbundling. On the other side, van Reeven 
(2008) shows that scale economies do not provide a justification for general subsidization of urban 
public transport. The same result was already found in Matas and Raymond (1998) for the Spanish 
case. 
Furthermore, Roy and Yvrande-Billon (2006) use data on French municipalities to estimate a 
stochastic frontier model that corroborates that technical efficiency of urban public transport operators 
depends on their ownership regime and the type of contract governing their transactions.  
This brief presentation of the main groupings of work in the field of urban transportation systems 
highlights the relevance of the analysis we propose. This study is embedded within the literature on 
the determinants of urban public transport demand and supply. Our first contribution is being the first 
study that uses a rich international sample of large European cities (with detailed information on the 
local basis) in order to estimate separately and simultaneously both aggregate demand and supply 
equations. This is especially relevant since past literature has been analyzed these equations 
separately, focused on one or two modes of public transport, and treated single region samples.  
More importantly, our second contribution to the literature is that we explore for the first time the 
relevance of different institutional or regional frameworks that seem to play an important role in the 
determination of public transport demand and supply across the continent. This opening up of regional 
heterogeneity and institutional variability in urban transportation organization is possible thanks to the 
international nature of our sample, and provides promising results that can stimulate future research on 
the role of institutions and regional heterogeneity in the formation of supply and demand. 
3. Empirical Strategy 
In this section we describe the data and the model we have used to explain the demand and supply 
sides of local public transportation in European cities.  
3.1 Data 
Most data used in this research are obtained from the Mobility in Cities Database (MCD) provided by 
the International Association of Public Transport (UITP). This database offers 120 indicators of public 
transport (not, unfortunately, including ownership data) from 52 worldwide cities in 2001, almost all 
in Europe. In order to improve the homogeneity of the sample and to be able to carry out our extension 
regarding institutional and regional factors, we focus particularly on the data from the 45 European Daniel Albalate and Germà Bel 
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cities, although we take advantage as well of the available data for the remaining cities.
3 Institutional 
data have been collected from different sources as we indicate when describing each of these 
variables. 
Table 1 reports the cities and some of their socio-demographic characteristics in order to illustrate 
the variability of our sample. Table 2 classifies these cities by region to show that our sample uses 
cities of sufficient regional variety to capture a wide range of social and economic attributes and 
heterogeneous institutional frameworks, thus avoiding results led by certain types of cities. In spite of 
this, we must acknowledge that the weights of Mediterranean and Center-European metropolitan areas 
are slightly higher than the rest of regional groups (Nordic, Atlantic and Eastern). 
Table 1. European cities in the database and socio-demographic characteristics 
Metropolitan Area Population  GDP 
Urban Pop. 
Density 
Amsterdam 850  000  34  100  57.3 
Athens  3 900 000  11 600  65.7 
Barcelona  4 390 000  17 100  74.7 
Berlin  3 390 000  20 300  54.7 
Bern 293  000  35  500  41.9 
Bilbao  1 120 000  20 500  51.9 
Bologna 434  000  31  200  51.6 
Brussels 964  000  23  900  73.6 
Budapest  1 760 000  9 840  46.3 
Clermont-Ferrand 264 000  24 200  44.5 
Copenhagen  1 810 000  34 100  23.5 
Dublin  1 120 000  35 600  25.9 
Geneva 420  000  37  900  49.2 
Gent 226  000  26  700  45.5 
Glasgow  2 100 000  20 600  29.5 
Graz 226  000  29  600  31 
Hamburg  2 370 000  38 800  33.9 
Helsinki 969  000  36  500  44 
Krakow  759 000  7 010  58.4 
Lille  1 100 000  21 800  55 
Lisbon  2 680 000  17 100  27.9 
London  7 170 000  36 400  54.9 
Lyons  1 180 000  27 100  40 
Madrid  5 420 000  20 000  55.7 
Manchester  2 510 000  22 400  40.4 
Marseilles 800  000  22  700  58.8 
Milan  2 420 000  30 200  71.7 
Moscow  11 400 000  6,060  161 
                                                      
3  Thus, seven cities receive minor consideration in our analysis: Chicago, Sao Paulo, Tunis, Dubai, Hong Kong, Singapore, 
and Melbourne. These cities belong to very diverse World regions: North America, South America, North Africa, West 
Asia, East Asia, and Oceania). Considering these cities would introduce severe heterogeneity in the sample we use, and 
would prevent us from undertaking the regional analysis, which is one of the main contributions in this paper. More 
importantly, the database lacks information on some relevant variables used in our model to test explanatory determinants 
of supply and demand. Later we come back to this issue.  What shapes local public transportation in Europe? 
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Munich  1 250 000  45 800  52.2 
Nantes 555  000  25  200  34.7 
Newcastle  1 080 000  18 400  42.5 
Oslo 981  000  42  900  26.1 
Paris  11  100 000  37 200  40.5 
Prague  1  160 000  15 100  44 
Rome  2  810 000  26 600  62.6 
Rotterdam  1  180 000  28 000  41.4 
Seville  1  120 000  11 000  51.1 
Stockholm  1  840 000  32 700  18.1 
Stuttgart  2  380 000  32 300  35.3 
Tallinn 399  000  6,880  41.9 
Turin  1  470 000  26 700  46.1 
Valencia  1  570 000  14 300  50.2 
Vienna  1  550 000  34 300  66.9 
Warsaw  1  690 000  13 200  51.5 
Zürich 809  000  41  600  44.5 
Source: Mobility in Cities Database (UITP 
Table 2. European cities in the database by region. 
Southern Center-Europe  Northern  Eastern 
Athens Amsterdam  Dublin  Budapest 
Barcelona Berlin  Copenhagen  Krakow 
Bilbao Bern  Glasgow  Moscow 
Bologna Brussels  Helsinki  Prague 
Clermont-Ferrand Geneva  London Tallin 
Lisbon Gent  Manchester  Warsaw 
Lyons Graz  Newcastle   
Madrid Hamburg  Oslo  
Marseilles Lille  Stockholm   
Milan Munich   
Nantes Paris    
Rome Rotterdam    
Seville Stuttgart    
Turin Vienna   
Valencia Zürich     
3.2 The Basic Model  
In this study we attempt to estimate both aggregate supply and demand equations for local public 
transport for our 45 European cities. On one hand, our basic supply equation can be considered as a 
production function of urban transport expressed in the following form: 
 
Supply = f (income, operational_costs, city_characteristics)            (1) 
Therefore, supply for local public transport is supposed to rely on the recovery rate of the service by 
the producer (income over costs) and other city characteristics like economic wealth or density.
4 
                                                      
4  The labor factor can be considered to be included in the operational costs variable. City characteristics could have a 
significant impact on supply given the needs of citizens, or due to their impact on efficiency and equity. Daniel Albalate and Germà Bel 
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On the other hand, the aggregate demand for public transport services can be assumed to depend on 
the attributes of the service affecting the generalized cost of transport (monetary cost, time cost,.…), 
but also on the properties of the alternative modes and city characteristics as well. For this reason our 
demand equation considers all these factors by assuming they can be expressed as an extension of the 
generalized transport cost equation, which can be assumed to follow the next form: 
 
Demand = h ( price, time, city_characteristics)         (2) 
In this case demand is affected by the price of the service for the user, the time spent in the journey 
(walking time, waiting time, in-vehicle time, as well as the time spent in the alternative mode) and city 
characteristics. For this reason we will consider not only urban public transport variables, but also 
variables describing private transport and city characteristics that can capture these time dimensions. 
As a result, the basic equation system to be estimated – still without considering institutional and 
regional variables - in order to explain local public transport supply and demand for these 45 European 
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where the first equation (3) refers to the supply equation and the second (4) to the demand equation. 
The sub-index i makes reference to each city.  
3.3 The Functional form choice 
The double-log specification facilitates the interpretation of the estimated coefficients in terms of 
elasticities and has been selected after considering the results of the Box Cox test for functional form 
choice.
5 In order to choose the appropriate functional form, comparisons of the estimated Box Cox 
regressions were made by using log likelihood ratio tests. As a result of the hypothesis tests that are 
displayed in table 3, we expect better performance of double log specification given that we reject the 
hypothesis of lambda (λ) being equal to 1, which means that transformation is needed to the linear 
model. On the contrary, the assumption of lambda (λ) and theta (θ) being equal to 0, what implies a 
log-linear functional form, is not rejected by the Box Cox test. This result is valid for both supply and 
demand equations. 
                                                      
5  The Box Cox transformation is used in many empirical works since it appeared in Box and Cox (1964). Formally, the 
transformation is presented as g
(λ)(x) = (x
λ-1)/λ . This implies that when λ = 1 it is a linear model, while when λ = 0 we 
have a log-lineal model (Greene, 2000). Estimation is by maximum likelihood, assuming a normal error. LR tests are 
usually employed to test if the variables should appear in linear or log form (Kennedy, 2003). For a deeper overview on 
this and other methods of testing functional forms see MacKinnon, White and Davidson (1983). What shapes local public transportation in Europe? 
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Table 3. Hypothesis test´s results for determining the appropriate functional form 
Model  Null Hypothesis  Statistic  Conclusion on null 
 hypothesis 
Supply      
Linear  Ho: λ=θ=1  5.11** Reject 
Double log  Ho: λ=θ=0  0.80 Accept 
      
Demand      
Linear  Ho: λ=θ=1  12.11***  Reject 
Double log  Ho: λ=θ=0  1.21  Accept 
Note 1. Significance at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). 
In any case, we provide estimates based on linear functional forms in the appendix (A2) to show that 
this assumption is not critical for the purpose of our study because almost all our results remain 
unchanged. 
3.4 Basic model variables 
The dependent variables are, respectively, the number of place-km per capita in the case of the supply 
equation, and the number of passenger-km per capita for the demand equation.  
Several variables enter as covariates in supply and demand equations in order to explain local public 
transportation. The variables and their expected relationships with the dependent variables are 
described below.  
Background variables 
GDP: Gross domestic product per capita. This variable captures income and economic wealth. 
Richer cities can provide better and more extensive local public transportation. At the same time 
mobility is positively correlated with the economic activity and for this reason we expect to confirm 
positive impacts on both demand and supply equations due to the introduction of this variable.
6 
DENS: Urban population density. This variable captures city characteristics and urban form. It is 
well known and widely recognized that mobility and mode choice is affected by city form (Nijkamp 
and Rienstra, 1996). Cameron, Kenworthy and Lyons (2003) stress that private motorized mobility, 
for instance, although arising from local decisions, is determined by the structure of the urban 
environment. In general, dense cities are associated with a high use of public transport (Newman and 
Kenworthy, 1989). Therefore, the choice between public and private transport systems is influenced 
by urban form. For this reason dense cities are expected to have large transport systems since supply 
becomes profitable (or less expensive) by taking advantage of scale and density economies. In 
addition, density is expected to explain both transport demand and supply. In the case of demand it is 
worth pointing out that the expected positive correlation that exists between dense cities and short 
distances to public transport stations implies a negative correlation between dense cities and walking 
time, which is one of the temporal dimensions of the generalized cost of travel. 
PRICE: Average price charged to urban transport users. Prices are usually regulated by public 
authorities and are rarely driven by market (demand) forces. Price is usually considered a political 
issue, and for this reason we do not suffer from endogeneity problems in the supply equation by its 
presence. This rigidity makes us expect no influence of prices on transport supply because public 
                                                      
6  It is important to highlight that the database “Mobility in Cities” does not contain information related to personal income 
in these cities, which is a variable usually introduced in this kind of transport models.  Daniel Albalate and Germà Bel 
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transport in Europe is highly subsidized and regulated. Indeed, the average subsidy in Europe is 48% 
according to UITP (2005) estimates. On the other hand, prices always affect individual demand 
decisions, and for this reason we will expect strong impacts on transport aggregate demand. 
OCOST: Average operating cost of one public transport place-km. This variable reflects the 
operating cost of providing each place-km. For this reason we expect a negative relationship between 
the operational cost and transport supply. The more expensive the place –km is, the lower the number 
of place-km offered by public authorities. 
FLEET: The fleet of vehicles available for public transport purposes. Within this category we 
include the number of buses, metro wagons, and trams.
7 Having more public vehicles implies better 
service in the sense that the number of vehicles is associated with frequency, which captures a 
temporal dimension “out of vehicle” (waiting time) resulting in the service being more convenient and 
of higher quality. Given this rationale, we expect higher transport demand in cities providing more 
vehicles. In fact, this is a supply variable and it is usually assumed that there is an indirect effect from 
supply to demand.
8  
PUBSPEED: Average speed of public transport vehicles in operation. Speed is associated with 
service quality and is correlated to “in vehicle” time. Since this is extremely related to time savings, it 
becomes an essential factor of the generalized costs of transport equation. A consequence, we expect 
positive relationships between speed and transport demand.
9 
PRIVATE_TIME: Average time spent by private vehicle trip. Time spent in private transport has 
an increasing impact on demand for public transport since private transport is negatively related to 
public transport demand as a substitute commodity. Therefore, it is a relevant factor of the generalized 
transport cost equation for the traveler since it captures the opportunity cost--in terms of time--of 
choosing public transport. As private journey duration grows, public transport, at a reasonable speed, 
becomes relatively more convenient for the traveler. 
MOTOR: Motorization constructed as the number of private vehicles per thousand population. 
More private vehicles tend to lower incentives to use public transport. For this reason we expect 
negative relationships between car ownership and public transport demand.
10 However, there is an 
important caveat. This figure reflects the motorization of the metropolitan area, but private transport 
from outside the limits of the metropolitan area is to be expected. For this reason our variable cannot 
capture the whole participation of private vehicles in the metropolitan area, but it does represent an 
important share. 
PARKING: The number of parking spaces per thousand jobs in the Central Business District. This 
indicator offers information on private transport convenience for the traveler needing mobility to 
work. Parking space is an essential factor in private transport choice. As a result, we expect negative 
                                                      
7  Some potential problems could emerge from aggregating different types of public transport. For instance, Farsi, Fetz and 
Filippini (2007) analyze the existence of scale and scope economies for a sample of 16 multimodal transport firms (tram, 
trolleys and motor buses) in Switzerland and find evidence of important scope economies. Given that the cities in our 
sample differ regarding the combination of types of public transport provided, different cost structures could be at work. 
Being this said, we believe this does not significantly undermine our analysis.  
8  As pointed out by a referee, somehow demand is expected to affect supply design as well. Nonetheless, entering demand 
as covariate would generate endogeneity and multicollineality problems and would partially prevent us to test the simple 
relationship between supply and the demand-enhancing variables already introduced. 
9  One can argue that speed also affects transport supply since it decreases operational costs. However, we already introduce 
the operational cost in the supply equation. 
10  Low supply of public transport could increase the need of having private vehicles to travel. In this sense, motorization 
would be affected by public transport supply. The inverse relationship is not so clear. For this reason we avoid the use of 
motorization in the supply equation. In fact, even when we introduce this variable our results do not change and 
motorization itself is not statistically significant at all. What shapes local public transportation in Europe? 
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impacts on demand for public transport as parking spaces increase. Button (2006) recognizes the 
importance of this necessary supply, since he suggests that automobiles spend over 95% of their time 
‘parked’, and trucks over 85%. 
3.5 Institutional variables 
One of the aims and contributions of this paper is to study the effect of institutional factors and the 
role of geography (regional heterogeneity) in supply and demand determination. For this reason we 
extent the basic model by adding several institutional variables to test their impact on local public 
transportation. Next we describe the variables introduced and the expected relationships. 
Institutional variables 
Dcapital: A dummy variable taking value one if the city is a political capital and zero otherwise. By 
using this variable we are interested in possible biases derived from politics on supply and from 
administrative services as well as from other specific characteristics of political capitals on demand. If 
this view is right, then we would expect positive impacts on the number of passenger-Km per capita 
due to services provided in political capitals. If this variable is also positively correlated to supply 
(places-Km per inhabitant) then we would find higher supply where political powers are hosted, 
although we should also consider the indirect effect of demand on supply. 
ELECTED_MAYOR: Similarly, with this variable we capture the political restrictions of those in 
charge of the design of public transportation. Whether the mayor is appointed or elected might affect 
the need of policy makers to win elections. To this regard, elected mayors might have higher 
incentives to seek political objectives by promoting more and better transport supply to voters. This is 
a usual assumption in a political economy framework, especially for national policy formation, but this 
is not commonly tested at local level. Data to construct this binary variable, which identifies with 
value 1 when the mayor is elected and 0 when appointed, is obtained the Database of Political 
Institutions by the World Bank, as well as from own consultation and collection of political 
institutions and electoral systems. 
CONTRACTING: This binary variable identifies with value 1 those cities that by 2001 had either 
totally or significantly contracted out the bus public transportation service and 0 otherwise. The aim of 
introducing this institutional factor (or regulatory type) is to capture the effect of privatization 
compared to the production in house of the service. We introduce this variable both in the supply and 
demand equations since contracting might also have impacts on the demand if contracting implies 
differences in quality (as hypothesized in Hart, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). In fact, according to Public 
Choice views, contracting out could be associated with a lower supply of transportation, since 
privatization and competition for the contracts would reduce incentives for oversupply existing under 
public management, as hypothesized since the seminal work by Niskanen (1971).
11 We test this 
hypothesis with the addition of this variable as a covariate in the supply equation. 
We have used several sources to construct this variable, from academic works - as van de Velde 
(2001, 2005, 2007), Preston and van de Velde (2002), Donchenko, Kunin and Kazmin (2003), Gleijm 
(2003), Cambini and Filippini (2003), Ojala, Naula and Queiroz (2004), and Farsi, Fetz and Filippini 
(2007) - to direct contact to local public transportation entities from the cities in the sample, such as 
Helsinki, Nantes, and Clermont-Ferrand.  
GINI: With this variable we are interested in finding whether personal income inequality can lead 
to higher public transport supply on one hand and less private transport use (Demand) on the other. 
This variable is the gini index at the national level and we collected its value for each country from 
Eurostat.  
                                                      
11  See Boyne (1998) for a wider explanation linking public choice and the delivery of local public services.  Daniel Albalate and Germà Bel 
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DECENTR: This last institutional variable reflects the degree of political decentralization. We 
think it is interesting to check whether higher empowerment of sub-national governments, resulting in 
enhanced fiscal capabilities, might positively affect the supply of local public transport. Decentr takes 
value 1 when there is some degree of decentralization (regional institutions having authority over 
taxing, spending or legislating), and 0 otherwise. Data on this variable are obtained from the Database 
of Political Institutions by the World Bank. 
Our small sample sets limits to our ability to extent the model by adding many institutional 
variables. In fact, we are aware that it is not possible to capture all relevant institutional determinants. 
Our attempts to characterize local public transportation by means of regional variables also try to 
better identify the institutional factors behind the choice of local public transport supply and its 
implications on demand. 
3.6 Geographical variables  
As stated, this work tries to test the impact of regional variables on the determination of public 
transportation supply and demand. On our view, regional factors capture geographical characteristics, 
behavior and mobility patterns, different traditions of government intervention in the economy, as well 
as other institutional factors not singled out previously. Next we describe the variables used to test the 
impact of regional factors on transportation supply and demand. 
Regional variables 
DSOUTH: A binary variable identifying cities close to the Mediterranean Sea with value 1, and 0 
otherwise. This variable includes cities from Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Southern France. 
DNORTH: A binary variable identifying cities from the north of the continent (Nordic and Atlantic 
cities) with value 1 and 0 otherwise. In this category we find cities from Denmark, Finland, Ireland, 
Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
DEAST: A binary variable identifying cities from the east of the continent (former Communist 
countries) with value 1, and 0 otherwise. The variable includes cities from Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Poland, and the Russian Federation.  
These dummy variables will be compared to the reference region that is the group of Center-
European cities, which includes Austria, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Northern France, and 
Switzerland. Therefore, the interpretation of the impact of the coefficients associated with these binary 
variables must take into account this reference group. 
Besides these dummy variables we also treated regional determinants by introducing two 
continuous geographical variables as longitude and latitude instead of the binary regional variables to 
better identify regional effects in a more flexible form. To construct these variables we used the 
geographical coordinates of each city. 
The summary of definitions, descriptive statistics and expected signs associated with all variables 
defined in these sections, are displayed in table 4. A correlation matrix is also available in the 
appendix (A3) What shapes local public transportation in Europe? 
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Table 4. Independent variables. Definition, descriptive statistics and expected relationship with dependent variable. 




 Transportation variables     
GDP  Gross Domestic Product per inhabitant (Euro)  25 577  10 361  45 800  6,060  +  + 
DENS  Urban population density  49.29  21.59  161.0  18.1  +  + 
PRICE  Average cost of one public transport passenger-km for the traveler (0.01 Euro)  9.32  5.00  23  0.6  +/-  - 
OCOST  Average operating cost of one public transport place-km (0.01 Euro)  3.42  1.55  8.06  0.48  -   
PUBSPEED  Average speed of public transport vehicles in operation (Km/h)  27.54  1.11  41.8  14.1    + 
PRIVATE_TIME  Average duration of a private motorized trip (minutes)  21.76  0.72  32  14    + 
PARKING  Number of parking spaces per thousand jobs in the Central Business District.  222.77  28.00  778  30    - 
MOTOR  Private passenger cars per thousand inhabitants  468  119  770  193    - 
            
Institutional variables     
Dcapital  Binary variable taking value 1 if the city is a political capital and 0 otherwise. 0.48  0.07  1  0  +/-  + 
DCONTRACTING  Binary variable taking value 1 if the service is contracted out and 0 otherwise. 0.30  0.07  1  0  - +/- 
DELECTED_MAYOR  Binary variable taking value 1 if the city Mayor is elected and 0 otherwise.  0.69  0.06  1  0  +   
DDECENTR  Binary variable taking value 1 if there is some degree of political decentralization in the 
country and 0 otherwise 
0.70 0.07  1  0 +/-   
GINI  Gini index for income inequality  29.50  0.64  41.3  22  +  + 
            
Institutional variables     
DSOUTH  Binary variable taking value 1 if the city is Mediterranean, and 0 otherwise  0.36  0.07  1  0  -  - 
DNORTH  Binary variable taking value 1 if the city is Nordic or Atlantic and 0 otherwise 0.21  0.06  1  0  +/-  +/- 
DEAST  Binary variable taking value 1 if the city is an Eastern city and 0 otherwise  0.11  0.05  1  0  +   
LATIT  Geographical latitude  48.38  090  60  37  +/-  +/- 
LONGIT  Geographical longitude  7.56  1.43  -9  37  +/-  +/- 
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4. Estimation and Results 
We first estimate our equation system using the Heteroskedasticity-Robust Ordinary Least Squares 
estimator (OLS) for each equation separately. Afterwards we implement a SUR model (Seemingly 
Unrelated Regression, also called joint generalized least squares or Zellner estimation), which jointly 
estimates the equation system allowing for correlation between error terms through equations.
12 This 
last strategy is used when it is unrealistic to expect that in a set of equations, errors would be 
uncorrelated. This is in turn a more efficient estimator than OLS. Indeed, substantial efficiency gains 
are expected while contemporaneous disturbances in different equations are highly correlated.
13 The 
SUR method uses the correlations among the errors in different equations to improve the regression 
estimates, but requires an initial OLS regression to compute residuals. The OLS residuals are used to 
estimate the cross-equation covariance matrix. Indeed, it is very likely that some factors not included 
in the equation may affect both urban supply and demand. 
Table 5 displays our results for separate and joint estimations. Overall explanatory power is high 
for every method of estimation, especially for demand equations. As results show, the goodness of fit 
of the models is satisfactory for each separate equation and for the joint estimation as well. Moreover, 
no substantial differences are found between OLS and SUR estimates, which imply that OLS was 
already highly efficient in our case. 
Table 5. Least-squares estimates and Seemingly unrelated regression results for the basic model 
(45 European cities) 
Regressors OLS  SUR 
 Supply  Demand  Supply  Demand 
GDP  1.069 (5.08)***  0.7202 (3.05)***  1.159 (4.80)***  0.7852 (3.85*)** 
DENS  0.0856 (0.50)  -0.1172 (-0.83)  0.0606 (0.30)  -0.1133 (-0.79) 
PRICE  -0.2246 (-1.64)  -0.6279 (-6.68)***  -0.2371 (-1.54)  -0.7021 (-6.55)***
OCOST  -0.7789 (-3.88)***  -  -0.8373 (-4.00)***  - 
FLEET  - 0.5454  (3.60)*** - 0.3724  (3.11)*** 
PUBSPEED  -  0.5008 (1.34)  -  0.3920 (2.00)** 
PRIVATE_TIME  - 0.7730  (3.56)*** -  0.6142 (2.55)** 
PARKING  -  -0.1584 (-1.46)  -  -0.1395 (-2.02)* 
MOTOR  -  -0.0012 (-2.22)**  -  -0.0011 (-2.01)** 
Intercept  -5.489 (-2.50)**  -4.651 (-2.31)** -6.215  (-2.36  )** 0.3724  (3.11)*** 
       
R2 0.40  0.84  0.46  0.83 
F- Test (Joint significance)  11.23***  45.37***  -  - 
Ramsey RESET test for omitted 
variables 
0.07 0.49  -  - 
Chi2 (Joint significance) -  - 31.41***  180.77*** 
Note 1. T-statistics and Z-statistics based on robust to heteroskedasticity standard errors are in parenthesis. 
Note 2. Significance at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). 
Interesting results arise from our estimations. In separate estimations for the basic model we find that 
GDP produces positive impacts on the supply side of local public transportation across the 45 
European cities. Therefore, being richer implies higher number of place-km per inhabitant than 
relatively poorer cities. On the other hand, the operational cost of the service is the main variable 
pushing to negatively impacts on place-km per capita supplied. The other variables, including the 
average price of a passenger-km and urban population density, do not present statistically significant 
coefficients. This result of fare effects on supply is not strange if we consider that prices are highly 
                                                      
12  In SUR strategy the equations are estimated as a set in order to increase efficiency. 
13  See the seminal work by Zellner (1962) on Seemingly Unrelated Regression Equations. What shapes local public transportation in Europe? 
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regulated and usually driven by political goals, rather than operational costs. At the same time, urban 
population density was thought to affect supply through its impacts on economic efficiency, but its 
coefficient does not seem statistically significant at all. It is possible that urban population density is 
not able to capture urban form by itself.  
Regarding demand equations we find that coefficients associated with GDP, with the fleet of 
vehicles provided, the average time spent in private transport trips, and the average speed of public 
transport are all positively correlated with passenger-km per capita. On the other hand, the coefficients 
associated with the average price of public transport, the level of motorization and the number of 
parking spaces in the central business district, are statistically significant but impose negative impacts 
on public transport demand. All impacts work in the expected direction, while density does not 
provide any statistically significant impact on demand.  
Furthermore, paying attention to the differences between the OLS and SUR estimations, we realize 
that the results displayed provide few and almost insignificant changes on the statistical significance of 
the coefficients related to the variables used in the separate models. As is shown, the explanatory 
power of this estimation remains the same for demand and slightly increases for supply. Several 
coefficients improve their statistical significance. Particularly, we find that the average speed of public 
transport is now statistically significant at 5% and the coefficient associated with the number of 
parking spaces is now significant at 10%. As a result, there are efficiency gains from the use of SUR 
models, but these are rather small. 
As mentioned, the original data base contained seven non-European cities. By taking advantage of 
the available data on them, we have been able to extend this basic estimation by including as well 
Chicago, Dubai, Hong Kong and Singapore (whereas Sao Paulo, Tunis, and Melbourne were not 
possible to include do to too many missing values). In the appendix (A1) we provide some estimates 
for models in which these four additional cities are included in the regression. We show that 
introducing these observations does not change results on structural variables (with the only exception 
being density regarding supply). More interestingly, we provide some evidence that this group of non-
European cities seems to enjoy lower supply values, since the associated coefficient to a dummy 
variable identifying these observations is negative and statistically highly significant for the supply 
equation, although it is not for demand. 
Institutional variables 
Once we have determined the basic factors affecting urban transportation supply and demand from a 
statistical point of view, we attempt to replicate the estimation by introducing the selected institutional 
variables described in section 3. For this reason we extent the model by adding the different 
institutional variables, and replicate the same estimation strategy. The first column in Table 6 displays 
SUR estimates with the institutional variables, which allow a comparison with results presented in the 
last column of Table 5. Daniel Albalate and Germà Bel 
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Table 6. Seemingly unrelated regression results with institutions and regional covariates 
(45 European cities) 
Regressors SUR  SUR  SUR 
 Supply  Demand  Supply  Demand  Supply  Demand 
Background variables      
GFP  .8308 (3.76)***  0.6854 (3.48)***  0.6786 (3.34)***  0.6327 (3.13)***  0.5545 (2.62)***  0.8647 (3.76)*** 
DENS  -0.1073 (-0.51)  0.0631 (-0.40) 0.0054(0.03)    -0.1818  (-0.89) -0.1026  (-0.61) 
PRICE  0.0247 (0.16)  -0.5685 (-4.32)***  -0.0173 (-0.10)  -0.6275 (-3.18)***  0.0870 (0.63)  -0.6149 (-4.52)*** 
OCOST  -0.7391(-3.59)*** - -0.3993  (-1.96)** - -0.7467  (-4.16)*** - 
FLEET  -  0.2213 (1.44)  -  0.1330 (0.76)  -  0.3062 (1.73)* 
PUBSPEED  -  0.2750 (1.34)  -  0.1086 (0.50)  -  0.3981 (1.96)** 
PRIVATE_TIME  -  0.5076 (1.84)*  -  0.3568 (1.21)  -  0.1582 (0.61) 
PARKING  - -0.1807  (-2.31)** - -0.2132  (-2.13)** -  -0.2196  (-3.17)*** 
MOTOR  - -0.0009  (-1.51) - -0.0006  (-0.99) - -0.0010  (-1.52) 
          
Institutional variables          
Dcapital  0.5586 (4.17)***  0.3859 (3.03)***  0.4526 (3.64)***  0.4418 (3.26)***  0.7011 (5.19)***  0.3401 (2.44)** 
CONTRACTING  -0.1224  (-1.80)*  -0.0032 (-0.03)  -0.1012 (-1.01)  -0.0095 (-0.07)  -0.2139 (-2.16)**  -0.0005 (-0.00) 
DECENTR  0.0405 (0.27)  -  0.0832 (0.69)  -  0.1159 (1.00)  - 
 ELECTED_ MAYOR  -0.0616 (-0.34)  -  0.0953 (0.64) - -0.0303  (-0.16) - 
GINI  0.0212 (1.61)  0.0020 (0.16)  0.0201 (1.81)*  0.0122 (0.91)  0.0298 (2.79)***  0.0035 (0.28) 
          
Geographical variables          
Dsouth  -  -  -0.2993 (-2.42)**  -0.2176 (-1.65)*  -  - 
Dnorth  -  -  0.1940 (0.90)  -0.0168 (-0.09)  -  - 
Deast  -  -  0.4477 (1.67)*  -0.1001 (-0.25)  -  - 
LATIT  - - - -  0.4577  (3.64)***  0.1809  (1.18) 
LATIT^2  - - - -  -0.0044  (-3.38)***  -0.0020  (-1.35) 
LONGIT  - - - -  -0.0163  (-1.00)  -0.0217  (-1.37) 
LONGIT^2  - - - -  0.0005  (0.60)  0.0014  (1.57) 
          
Intercept  -3.751 (-1.56)  -1.142 (-0.49)  -3.005 (-1.34)  0.8441 (0.31)  -12.558 (-3.41)***  -6.284 (-1.79)* 
R2  0.65 0.84  0.78    0.84 0.79 0.87 
Chi2 (Joint significance)  67.59***  204.50*** 126.46*** 213.16***  139.11***  256.66*** 
Note 1. Z-statistics based on robust to heteroskedasticity standard errors are in parenthesis. 
Note 2. Significance at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). 
Note 3. Notice that we use only 44 observations, because of the lack of institutional  information on the city of Moscow.What shapes local public transportation in Europe? 
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As is shown, few differences are found for the basic model variables, while interesting results are 
achieved with this new group of variables. Being a political capital seems to affect supply decisions, 
because there is a positive and statistical significant correlation between its associated coefficient and 
the number of place-km per inhabitant, while also affects positively the number of passengers-km 
(Demand). On the contrary, the type of electoral system adopted to elect local mayors does not play 
any role on supply. The same happens for political decentralization.  
On the contrary, as the Public Choice literature suggests, contracting out seems to push supply 
downwards, given that its coefficient appears to be negative and statistically significant. This is 
particularly interesting due to the ongoing reform that several cities carried out during the last decade. 
However, results on this point need to be considered with caution. First, because we could not obtain 
detailed and precise data on the level of contracting out in these cities that use it, so we needed to rely 
on a dummy variable. Second, the early 2000s was a period of ongoing reform in this field, which may 
suggest quickly evolving environments regarding the use of contracting-out. 
In all, we have seen how some institutional variables seem to play a role in the determination of 
local public transport supply and demand. Particularly we realize that explanatory power seems to 
significantly increase when institutional variables are considered, especially for the supply equation. 
Regional variables 
After considering institutional variables we proceed now to provide the estimates by extending the 
model with regional variables that can capture institutional and geographic information not contained 
in the institutional variables already used. By doing this we wish to identify any regional effect or 
regularity having an impact on local public transportation.  
First of all, it is important to mention that all the other covariates from the basic model don’t 
change significantly. Being this said, we can analyze the selected results of table 6 and see that 
Mediterranean metropolitan areas have lower levels of public transport supply and demand than do the 
reference group of cities (Center-European). The coefficient associated with the Northern cities does 
not appear to be statistically significant in the supply and demand equations, while Eastern cities 
provide mixed results. On one hand, these cities seem to deliver higher supply than the other groups. 
On the other, the coefficient is not statistically significant in the demand equation. We must take into 
consideration that the number of observations in this last group of cities is smaller and we should be 
cautious about extracting general conclusions. Nonetheless, these cities are former Popular Republics 
and heritage from Communism might explain why they provide higher number of place-km per 
inhabitants than Center-European cities. 
As a result, institutional characteristics seem to play a role in the determination of the urban public 
transportation in the cities considered. These results suggest the direction chosen by each region.  
To go deeper into regional effects, we provide Non-parametric analysis (kernel densities) that 
relates the supply of urban public transport in the cities of our sample with their geographical latitude 
and longitude. This is a more flexible way to control for regional effects than the rigidity forced by 
binary variables. Figures 1 and 2 show the results of those kernel densities.  Daniel Albalate and Germà Bel 
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Figure 1. Kernel density. 
























-  Cities between -9º and 0º (ordered by longitude degree): Lisbon, Dublin, Seville, Glasgow, Madrid, Bilbao, Manchester, 
Valencia, Newcastle, Nantes, London, 
-  Cities between 1º and 10º (ordered by longitude degree): Barcelona, Paris, Clermont-Ferrand, Ghent, Lille, Amsterdam, 
Brussels, Lyon, Rotterdam, Marseilles, Geneva, Bern, Turin, Zurich, Hamburg, Milan, Stuttgart, Oslo. 
-  Cities between 11º and 20º (ordered by longitude degree): Bologna, Munich, Copenhagen, Rome, Berlin, Prague, Graz, 
Vienna, Stockholm, Budapest, Krakow. 
-  Cities between 21º and 37º (ordered by longitude degree): Warsaw, Athens, Helsinki, Tallinn, Moscow. 
Figure 2. Kernel density. 





















-  Cities between 37º and 44º (ordered by latitude degree): Athens, Seville, Lisbon, Valencia, Madrid, Barcelona, Rome, 
Bilbao, Marseilles, Bologna. 
-  Cities between 45º and 50º (ordered by latitude degree): Clermont-Ferrand, Lyon, Milan, Turin, Bern, Geneva, 
Budapest, Graz, Nantes, Zurich, Munich, Paris, Stuttgart, Vienna. 
-  Cities between 51º and 55º (ordered by latitude degree): Ghent, London, Rotterdam, Amsterdam Berlin, Warsaw, 
Dublin, Hamburg, Manchester, Newcastle, Copenhagen, Glasgow, Moscow. 
-  Cities between 56º and 60º (ordered by latitude degree): Oslo, Stockholm, Tallinn, Helsinki. What shapes local public transportation in Europe? 
17 
As the reader can observe, we find an inverted U-shape relationship between urban public transport 
supply and both geographical longitude and latitude. This means that the higher supply is expected in 
cities in the center of the continent. Therefore, we find a center-periphery scenario that tends to have 
its center on cities between 0º-10º of longitude and between 45º and 55º of latitude. The cities within 
this area are: Paris, Clermont-Ferrand, Ghent, Lille, Amsterdam, Brussels, Lyon, Rotterdam, Geneva, 
Bern, Turin, Zurich, Hamburg, Milan, and Stuttgart. Departing from this area, both Northern and 
Southern cities and both Western and Eastern cities seem to provide lower supply per capita.  
Regarding geographical longitude, we realized that western cities (Irish, British, Portuguese and 
most Spanish) provide lower urban public transport supply per capita. However, the level served is 
higher than the one delivered by Eastern cities.  
In order to further analyze this issue and confirm this quadratic functional form we substitute the 
regional dummies in the parametric estimation by latitude and longitude variables and their squared. 
The last column in table 6 provides these results. As can be checked, the parametric estimation 
confirms the importance of latitude in the supply determination, but longitude loses its impact, 
probably because parametric estimates cannot fully account for the real inverted U-Shape found in the 
Non-parametric analysis. Therefore, we find that supply tends to increase the higher is the latitude in 
which the city is placed, while for the highest degrees of latitude we find the inverse trend. However, 
as happened with regional dummies, geography does not seem to be as important for demand 
determination.  
5. Conclusions  
This paper investigates the factors that explain supply and demand of local public transportation by 
considering variables related to economics and mobility -already well established in the literature-, and 
by considering as well new variables reflecting institutional characteristics and geographical patterns. 
We find that being a political capital, the level of personal income inequality and contracting out to 
private firms influence supply, and have some influence on demand as well. Furthermore, by means of 
our regional analysis we capture geographical characteristics, behavior and mobility patterns, different 
traditions of government intervention in the economy, and other institutional factors that we are not 
able to single out with the available information.  
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we add to the existing literature on 
factors explaining demand and supply of local public transport by using an international sample of 
cities to jointly investigate demand and supply, whereas until now demand and supply had been 
analyzed separately using cross-country data on smaller samples, and supply and demand had been 
estimated simultaneously only using data from a single country. Our results are basically in line with 
those obtained in previous works, and our SUR estimation provides increased efficiency of the 
estimates.  
More importantly, we contribute to the literature as well by introducing in our analysis institutional 
and geographical factors as determinants of transport supply and demand. These types of factors have 
been largely neglected by previous empirical literature on demand and supply of local public 
transportation, but they might indeed play an important role on local public transportation 
determination. Therefore, this paper further connects the institutional and geographic fields to 
transportation at local level. 
Our analysis provides interesting results and new insights that add to the existing knowledge on 
urban public transportation, and open new avenues for research on factors related to institutions and 
geography. Future research should endeavor to further enrich this type of analysis by using larger and 
truly global samples of cities, as well as more refined data on institutions.  
 Daniel Albalate and Germà Bel 
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APPENDIX 
Table A1. Seemingly unrelated regression results (45 European cities + Chicago, Dubai, Hong 
Kong and Singapore) 
Regressors SUR 
 Supply  Demand 
Background variables  
GDP   1.073 (4.22)***  0.5105 (2.78)*** 
DENS 0.4367 (2.73)***  0.1536 (1.14) 
PRICE -0.1641 (-1.14)  -0.5467 (-4.79)*** 
OCOST -0.7236 (-3.26)***  - 
NON_EUROPEAN -0.9544 (-2.68)***  0.1273 (0.45) 
FLEET - 0.6274  (5.21)*** 
PUBSPEED - 0.6514  (3.58)*** 
PRIVATE_TIME - 0.6495  (2.48)** 
MOTOR - -0.1120  (-0.77) 
  
  
Intercept -7.067 (-2.67)***  -5.167 (-2.29)** 
R2 0.40 0.77 
Chi2 (Joint significance) 24.56***  130.79*** 
Note 1. Z-statistics based on robust to heteroskedasticity standard errors are in parenthesis. 
Note 2. Significance at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). 
Note 3. Cities excluded due to several missing values are Melbourne, Tunis and Sao Paulo. We excluded the 
variable PARKING from the model in order to keep Hong Kong in the sample, since it is the unique missing 
value for that city. 
Table A2. Seemingly unrelated regression for linear specification results with institutions and 
regional covariates (45 European cities) 
Regressors SUR 
 Supply  Demand 
Background variables  
GDP .0010 (1.71)*  0.0312 (2.01)** 
DENS -0.3977 (-1.09)  -6.541 (-0.99) 
PRICE 1.559 (1.19)  -108.63 (-3.72)***  
OCOST -12.804 (-3.77)***   
FLEET - 1.0321  (3.45)*** 
PUBSPEED - 21.782  (1.57) 
PRIVATE_TIME - -1.559  (-0.07) 
PARKING - -1.151  (-1.95)** 
MOTOR - -1.123  (-1.01) 
  
Institutional variables   
Dcapital 54.999 (5.43)***  483.49 (2.11)** 
CONTRACTING -9.221 (-1.81)*  60.742 (0.31) 
DECENTR 1.191 (1.08)  - 
ELECTED_MAYOR 1.531 (0.11)  - 
GINI 2.433 (2.83)***  5.077 (0.22) 
  
Geographical variables   
LATIT 31.588 (3.27)***  542.82 (2.33)** 
LATIT^2 -0.3100 (-3.08)***  -6.090 (-2.60)*** 
LONGIT -0.6979 (-0.54)  -7.7072 (-0.28) 
LONGIT^2 0.0398 (0.53)  1.1683 (0.74) 
  
Intercept -797.377 (-3.36)*** -1101  (-1.82)* 
R2 0.77 0.85 
Chi2 (Joint significance) 117.46***  210.81*** 
Note 1. Z-statistics based on robust to heteroskedasticity standard errors are in parenthesis.   
Note 2. Significance at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). 
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Table A3. Correlation matrix 
 GDP  DENS  PRICE  OCOST  FLEET  PUBSPEED  PRIVATE_TIME MOTOR PARKING  Dcapital  ELECTED_ 
MAYOR 
DECENTR CONTRACT GINI 
GDP  1                          
DENS  -0.4294 1                         
PRICE  0.5280 -0.3668  1                       
OCOST  0.6020  -0.2286    0.5357  1                     
FLEET  -0.0490 -0.0407  -0.0668  -0.1641  1                   
PUBSPEED  0.4072 0.0816  0.0552  -0.1334  0.0113  1                 
PRIVATE_TIME  -0.1483 0.3927  -0.4777  -0.1211  -0.1187  0.0792  1               
MOTOR  0.3474 -0.2386 -0.0450  0.4301  -0.1128  -0.2467  0.1730  1             
PARKING  -0.1205 -0.0763  -0.1387  0.0463  -0.3241  -0.3743  -0.2158  0.2812  1           
Dcapital  -0.0265 0.1655  -0.2654  -0.1607  0.4259  0.2306  0.2142  -0.2520  -0.2533  1         
ELECTED_MAYOR  -0.0619   0.0078    0.0994  -0.0327  -0.0442  -0.0192  0.0914  0.2340  0.0575  -0.1581  1       
DECENTR  0.0738 0.3513 -0.2255  0.2106  -0.1349  -0.0136  0.0067  0.5018  0.2048  0.3190  0.0374  1     
CONTRA  -0.0730  -0.2182  0.1984  -0.2593  0.0947    0.0381  -0.5419  -0.2578  0.2931  -0.1494    0.0315  -0.2282  1   
GINI  0.2871  0.0712  0.3584  0.2518  0.0693  0.2166  0.1359  0.0400  -0.0164    -0.2662  0.1131  0.0041  0.0795  1 
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